Laytime Clauses 装卸时间条款
2.236然而，在规定了习惯装卸时间的租船合同中，承租人没有责任在船舶抵达指定的目的地之后一定要立即开始装/卸货作业或者对由此引起的延迟由他来承担。这一点在以前我们提及过的Bargate Steam Shipping Co Ltd v. Penlee & St Ives Stone Quarries Ltd案中曾得到了充分的说明。其中明确规定：装卸时间从船舶抵达卸货泊位后的高潮时起算，无论船舶是在泊、抵达后靠泊或不在泊位上。然而，该轮由于当时港口拥挤未能及时靠泊，也因为这并不是在承租人的控制范围之内，所以被判定这延迟不应由他负责。有关船舶何时成为抵达船的条款与随后发生的事情是无关。不过，如果他们愿意这样做的话，也无法阻止当事双方在合同中订明为船东利益而免除其对拥挤造成的延迟所负的责任。这样一来，承租人就得对延迟承担责任，即使他已合理谨慎/谨慎处理/恪尽职守也不能要求免责。这正如在Charlton Steam Shipping Co v. T W Allen Sons and Gabriel，Wade & English—案中所判定的那样。
2.237 Alternatively, whilst the charter may have a speci?c destination, so that normally the vessel concerned would not be an Arrived ship until it reached the named destination, it may also provide for the vessel to proceed ‘‘as near thereto as she may safely get’’. Such a provision was included in the charter considered by the House of Lords in Robert H Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin and others. In this case a vessel arrived at the Surrey Commercial Docks, which were the named destination in the charterparty. On arrival at the dock gates, she was refused admittance because of congestion. The charterer declined to name an alternative discharging place and the master therefore took the vessel to the Deptford Buoys (the nearest place where the vessel could lie in safety) and discharged the cargo by lighters into the Surrey Commercial Docks. In holding that the master was warranted in so doing, the House of Lords held that the shipowner was not bound to wait for an unreasonable period until the dock authorities were able to allocate a berth in the docks.
2.237换句话说，当租船合同中也可能已经订明了特定的目的地，还可能要求船舶驶往‘她可以安全抵达的就近位置’，此时，通常有关的船舶只有在抵达所列明的位置时，才能算作抵达船舶。上议院审理的Robert H Dahl v. Nelson，Donkin and others—案的租船合同中就有这类条款。在该案中，船舶抵达了租船合同订明的目的地Surrey商业码头。由于港口拥挤，该轮被拒之在码头的港池入口之外。承租人拒绝指定另一个卸货地，船长于是将该轮驶往Deptford浮筒（她能安全停泊的最近地方）并在那儿将货卸到了驳船上，然后再由驳船运往Surrey商业码头。上议院肯定了船长的做法，之后判定：在码头当局能够空出码头泊位之前，船东是没有义务必须要继续等待这一段不合理的时间。
2.238 In these circumstances, it is submitted that the vessel becomes an Arrived ship when she reaches the place which is as near to the named place as she can get and at which the cargo is discharged.
Delays due to charterers/shippers/receivers
2.239 All parties to the voyage must act with reasonable diligence in the circumstances prevailing to enable the vessel concerned to be loaded and discharged in a reasonable time. The cases that follow are instances when it has been suggested that cargo interests, which will be the collective term used for parties in the heading above, have failed to meet this standard.
Failure to provide a berth on arrival
2.240 In some cases it has been suggested that a custom of the port requires a berth to be provided on arrival and, in others, it has been said that other commitments of cargo interests have prevented a berth being available.
2.241 In the former category, it was held in Aktieselskabet Hekla v. Bryson, Jameson & Co that in 1908 by the custom and practice of the port of Hull, there was an absolute obligation on the receiver of a wood cargo to have ready on the arrival in dock of a vessel with such cargo, a suitable berth for her and a clear quay space or a suf?cient number of railway bogies whereon or wherein her cargo could be discharged. However, some ten years later in The Lizzie, it was held by the House of Lords that, notwithstanding the existence of such a custom, any delay was excusable where the failure to comply was not due to a lack of reasonable diligence.
2.241对于前一种类型的案例中，在1908年的Aktieselskabet Hekla v. Bryson，Jameson & Co案中判决：根据英国Hull港的惯例及习惯做法，当载有木材这类货物的船舶抵达码头时，木材收货人是有绝对的义务必须准备好合适的泊位和清爽的码头空场或者足够可供接收所卸货物的铁路车皮。然而，10年后上议院在审理The Lizzie—案时却判定：尽管存在这种习惯，如果，只要没有满足这一习惯的要求不是因为当事方未尽恪尽职守之职，任何与之有关的延迟都可以免责。
2.242 The question of other commitments of cargo interests was considered in Harrowing and others v. Dupre, one of a series of cases arising out of the port regulations at Maryport which provided that, when other vessels were waiting to berth, each receiver might have only one vessel alongside at a time. In this case, four other vessels for the same receivers were ahead of the Ethelreda, the vessel concerned, in the queue of vessels waiting to berth. The charterers, against whom the action was brought, were also the shippers, but were not the receivers. In giving judgment, Bigham J held that the delay was not the fault of the charterers, and that where under a charterparty the delay complained of is such as ought to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of the contract, the shipowner has no cause of action against the charterer. The shipowner must therefore accept as reasonable any delay resulting from the normal business of cargo interests.
2.242 在Harrowing and others v. Dupre案，就货方其它失职行为问题进行了深入探讨。这也是由Maryport港口的规定而引起的一系列的案例之一。该港规定：当有其他船等泊时，每个货主的船只能有一艘靠在泊位上。在该案，同一货主的其他四艘船均早于Ethelreda轮到达，该案涉及的Ethelreda轮就在等泊之列。承租人，根据其行为来看，也是托运人，但不是收货人。Bingham法官在其给出的判词中判决道：延迟不是承租人的过错，并且根据租船合同，双方当事人在签订合同当时应该预料到这种讨厌的延迟情况，船东是没有诉因起诉承租人的。因此，船东也必须承受通常业务中由货方合理造成的任何延迟损失。
2.243 A similar situation arose in Barque Quilpue Ltd v. Brown, in which a sailing vessel was chartered by a colliery. To be able to berth, the ship had to produce a loading order from the colliery and this was not forthcoming for some time because of the number of other vessels on charter to the same colliery, although it was not proved that they had chartered an unreasonable amount of tonnage in relation to the ordinary course of their business. The Court of Appeal had no doubt that the charterparty was entered into on the footing that the charterers would carry on their business in the normal course, which might involve detention of the ship; they had not acted unreasonably and therefore were not liable for the delay.
2.243在Barque Quilpue Ltd v. Brown—案中也产生了类似情形。在该案中，煤矿场租用了一艘帆船。为了使其靠泊，船方不得不向煤矿提出了装货的要求，但是，由于那个煤矿同时还租用了其他一些船舶，所以不会马上有机会靠泊。至于该煤矿场是否为其正常业务的需求而租用了不合理的船舶吨位数就无法证实了。毫无疑问，上诉法院判定：立足于承租人在其开展的正常业务而签订的租船合同，就有可能牵连到船舶滞留的情况；因此，如果承租人没有什么不合理的行为，他们是不必对该船舶的延迟负责。